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In this thesis, an overview of current intrusion detection methods, evolutionary
computation, and immunity-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) is presented. An
application named Genetic Interactive Teams for Intrusion Detection Design and
Analysis (GENERTIA) is introduced which uses genetic algorithm (GA)-based hackers
known as a red team in order to find vulnerabilities, or holes, in an artificial immune
system (AlS)-based IDS. GENERTIA also uses a GA-based blue team in order to repair
the holes it finds. The performance of the GA-based hackers is tested and measured
according to the number ofdistinct holes that it finds. The GA-based red team’s behavior
is then compared to that of 12 variations of the particle swarm optimization (PSO)-based
red team named SWO, SW0+, SWl, SW2, SW3, SW4, CCSWO, CCSW0+, CCSWl,
CCSW2, CCSW3, and CCSW4. Each variant of the PSO-based red team differs in terms
of the way that it searches for holes in an IDS. Through this test, it is determined that
none of the red teams based on PSO perform as well as the one based on a GA.
However, two of the twelve PSO-based red teams, CCSW4 and SW0+, provide hole¬
finding capabilities closest to that of the GA. In addition to the ability of the different red
teams to find holes in an AlS-based IDS, the search behaviors of the GA-based hackers,
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PSO-based hackers that use a variable called a constriction coefficient, and PSO-based
hackers that do not use the coefficient are compared. The results of this comparison
show that it may be possible to implement a red team based on a hybrid “genetic swarm”
that improves upon the performance ofboth the GA- and PSO-based red teams.
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With each passing year, the Internet has experienced an increase in popularity.
This increase in popularity has had many positive consequences such as allowing large
numbers of people to leam how to take advantage of the numerous services that the
Internet provides and to gain interest in the Information Technology field. Despite these
benefits, there have been several negative consequences as well. For instance, as the
popularity of the Internet has increased, the frequency of attempts to hack into private
networks and individual computers, exploits of vulnerabilities in software and operating
systems, and other forms of malicious attacks have also increased.^ Naturally, Internet
users wish to protect their computers from attacks and seek some sort of computer
mechanism to protect their computers and their data. Compirter security systems can take
numerous forms such as anti-virus (AV) systems^ and firewalls.^ Another popular form
of computer security is an intrusion detection system (IDS).^ This form of computer
security is the focus ofthis thesis.
This thesis primarily focuses on an application, named GENERTIA, which
attempts to find and repair vulnerabilities in an IDS which could fail to prevent a hacker’s
attacks. GENERTIA is based on a problem-solving method known as a genetic
algorithm (GA). In this paper, the GENERTIA application is tested to determine
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whether it can discover 300 vulnerabilities in an IDS. Also, 12 versions ofGENERTIA,
based on another algorithm named particle swarm optimization (PSO), are compared to
the GA version in order to compare their performances. The results of these two
experiments are discussed later in this thesis.
The following five chapters of this paper cover the following topics: IDSs,
evolutionary computation (EC), immunity-based IDSs, PSO-based GENERTIA, and the
conclusion of the thesis. Chapter two covers IDSs and gives a basic overview of current
intrusion detection methods. Chapter three discusses EC, a family of problem-solving
algorithms which includes GAs and PSO. Chapter four, on immunity-based IDSs,
discusses four systems, including GENERTIA, that work to protect computer systems
from unauthorized access and attack. This chapter contains the results of the first
experiment with the GA-based GENERTIA mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Chapter five, discusses PSO-based GENERTIA and the results of the second experiment
with GENERTIA, which compares the GA version with the 12 PSO versions. The final
chapter, the conclusion, gives a summary of the thesis.
CHAPTER!
OVERVIEW OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (IDSs)
2.1. Introduction to IDSs
The concept of the modem IDS was originally developed by Dorothy Denning in
1987 as a method to detect security breaches, known as intrusion attempts, and to
produce alerts/ An intrusion attempt occurs when a user (or users) tries to access
computer resources that they are not authorized to use/ As its name suggests, an EDS is
used to detect the presence of these attempts. In addition to the detection of intmsion
attempts, IDSs can also be employed to perform a number of other network security tasks
such as preventing people from exploiting vulnerabilities in software, preventing the
disabling of resources by attackers, or even keeping network users from viewing
inappropriate websites.^
IDSs can suffer from two types of errors: false negatives (FN) and false positives
(FP).'* A FN occurs when an intmsion attempt goes undetected by the IDS; a FP occurs
when normal system activity is labeled as an intmsion attempt. Both of these
occurrences can decrease the effectiveness of an IDS. A high FP rate can cause actual




2.2. Types of IDSs
The methods used by an IDS to detect malicious activity can be divided into two
categories: anomaly detection and misuse detection.^ An anomaly detection IDS^
depends on a profile of normal network or computer behavior to detect attacks or
intrusion attempts.’ In order to generate this system profile, an anomaly-based IDS uses
a training period to observe “normal” system activity. Computer or network activity is
compared to the behavior profile in order to detect the presence of activity that deviates
from what is considered normal; any deviating activity is labeled anomalous and may be
a sign of malicious activity. A benefit of anomaly detection is that it is able to reveal
attacks that have not previously been encountered. This is because anomaly-based IDSs
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look for any abnormal activity. Anomaly-based IDSs suffer from high rates of FPs since
benign system activity may deviate from what is considered to be normal behavior.
Another weakness concerns the training period necessary to generate a profile of normal
system behavior. If any attacks occm during this period, the IDS will consider this
behavior to be normal and will not detect those attacks if they occur later.’ The second
method of intrusion detection, misuse detection,*’ uses a database of attack patterns.
similar to the virus signatures used in AV systems, to detect malicious system activity.**
Computer and network activity is compared to these attack patterns, and if any similarity
between the two is foimd, an alarm is generated. A benefit of this type of IDS is that the
attack signatures are able to be used in several different computing environments.
However, while this method can accurately detect attacks whose patterns are stored in the
pattern database, it is unable to detect new forms ofattack.*^ Also, since this form of IDS
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relies entirely on the database to detect attacks, the attack pattern database must be
updated regularly.
IDSs can be further divided into categories according to how they are situated on
a network: host-based or network-based.*^ A host-based IDS (HIDS)*^ provides security
by residing on the computer that needs to be protected. In order to detect the presence of
intrusion attempts, a HIDS monitors a computer's log files and incoming network trafiBc
for any potentially harmful activity.** The benefits of a HIDS include the ability to
monitor specific system activities such as attempts to access files and the fact that these
types of IDSs do not require any specific hardware in order to be deployed. While these
types of IDSs can be useful, they eire susceptible to evasion, a process where attackers
intrude into a system without generating an alarm. *^ This can be accomplished in many
ways, one of which is avoiding the use of system calls. HIDSs are also prone to being
disabled by an attacker.*’ A network-based IDS (NIDS)** provides protection by using
intrusion detection software called amonitor or a sensor situated in one or a few locations
on the network to observe all network activity.*^ These monitors analyze the traffic on
the network in order to detect the presence of malicious activity. Since there are only a
few monitors used in a NIDS, the administrator of a NIDS only has to manage a small
number of sensors. Other benefits of using this type of IDS include a lower deployment
cost due to the lower number ofnetwork monitors needed and the ability to detect attacks
against multiple hosts.^** Even though this method of intrusion detection may be more
attractive for networks that have a large number of hosts to be monitored, these IDSs
have some weaknesses as well. For instance, NIDSs suffer firom the inability to provide
as much information about attacks on specific computers as HIDSs can.^*
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2.2.1. Types of NIDSs
NIDSs can be further divided into three groups according to their overall
structure: monolithic, hierarchical, and cooperative.
2.2.2. Monolithic NIDSs
A monolithic NIPS functions by having each sensor on the network send
data regarding network traffic to a single serverwhich analyzes die data in order to detect
attacks. While this method is the simplest and can work well for smaller networks,
when the number of hosts on the system increases, the performance of the IDS will
decrease due to the increased amount of data that the server would have to process.^^
Also, the single server presents a single point of failure; in order to disable the EDS, an
attack would simply have to disable the server.
2.2J. Hierarchical NIDSs
A hierarchical NIPS divides a network into sections and uses a separate
sensor to monitor each section.^'^ Sensors in this type of IDS are arranged in a hierarchy;
local sensors send information regarding their sections of the network to another sensor
higher up in the hierarchy. This method is similar to amonolithic NIDS because it uses a
central server, except the central server only has to analyze the data transferred to it from
the sensors at the level directly below the server to detect attacks. As a result, more hosts
can be added to the system without significantly increasing the amount of data that the
server must process, making this type of IDS more scalable.^^ While this type of IDS
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eliminates the problem of scalability present in monolithic NIDS, it still presents a single
point of failure at the highest level in the hierarchy
2.2.4. Cooperative NlDSs
A cooperative NIPS differs from the other forms ofNIDSs in that it uses
several host-based monitors that communicate with each other?^ The functionality of the
central server is distributed among the different individual monitors that make up the
system. These individual monitors analyze traffic on each host and communicate with
one another in order to determine whether or not an attack has occurred. Co-operative
NIDSs eliminate the central server present in both monolithic and hierarchical NIDSs
and, as a result, eliminate the single point of failure present in these approaches. While
this method offers a major improvement over monolithic and hierarchical approaches, it
can suffer from decreased performance due to the communication between the host-based
monitors that make up the IDS.^*
23. Wireless IDSs
The IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks (WLANs) suffer from the same
types of attacks that wired LANs do in addition to other types of attacks due to flaws in
the 802.11 standard and the wireless nature of an 802.11 network.^^ The additional threat
to WLANs makes IDSs developed for wired networks unable to provide adequate
protection for a WLAN. As a result, wireless IDSs must be designed so that they can
detect the presence of both “normal” wired network attacks and wireless network attacks.
A wireless IDS must be able to handle occurrences that only affect WLANs such as
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cracking the Wireless Encryption Protocol (WEP) key, spoofing Medium Access Control
(MAC) addresses, and broadcasting deauthenticate fiumes.^^ The first attack, cracking
WEP keys, involves a weakness in WEP, a method used to encrypt data transmitted
across a WLAN. This method of encryption uses an algorithm called RC4 which has a
major weakness that allows the key used in order to encrypt data to be obtained by
“sniffing.” or collecting, enough encrypted data. Once the key has been obtained, the
encrypted data can be deciphered. Tools such as AirSnort^^ and WEPCrack^^ can
automate this type of attack, making it far easier to execute.^'* The second attack,
spoofing MAC addresses, exploits the MAC address-based authentication that many
types of WLANs use to authenticate users.^^ In order to gain access to the WLAN, an
intruder simply has to change the MAC address of his or her network card to that of a
user that is allowed to use the network. This process is known as spoofing. The third
attack, broadcasting deauthenticate fi’ames,^^ exploits the method that access points
(APs)^^ use to disconnect users fi'om a wireless network. An AP is a node on a wireless
network that users can connect to in order to get wireless service. In an 802.11 network,
an AP can disconnect a user by sending it a deauthenticate fi'ame. An attacker can
exploit this behavior by spoofing the address of an AP and sending a deauthenticate
flume to the broadcast address, causing every computer connected to that AP to receive it
■20
and be disconnected fi’om the WLAN.
Examples of wireless IDSs that can protect WLANs against these attacks and
others are AirDefense^^ and AirMagnet'*®. AirDefense provides protection against
intruders by supplying users with a system of sensors that connect with a separate console
that can be used to monitor intrusion attempts and possible misconfigurations ofwireless
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equipment. The AirMagnet system, on the other hand, is a software-based IDS that can
be run on a computer, usually a laptop, and requires that a user walk around the area to be
protected in order to detect attacks.
CHAPTERS
OVERVffiW OF EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION (EC)
3.1. Introduction to EC
EC can be defined as using algorithms that mimic the process of evolution in
order to solve problems.* These algorithms evolve a population comprised of possible
problem solutions called individuals or candidate solutions until a solution for a problem
is found. While there are different types of EC-based algorithms, they all generally
follow the same process in order to solve problems.^ First, a population is randomly
generated, and each individual is given a fitness. The fitness of an individual determines
the “quality” of the individual, often how close the individual is to being the optimal
solution for a problem.^ Afterwards, the population is used to create a new population
where individuals are altered in order to allow the population to evolve to the point A^diere
an optimal solution is found. The process of determining fitnesses and generating and
evolving new populations is repeated until a stopping condition is met.^
3.2. A BriefHistory of EC
Early work in EC was done by Bremermann, Friedberg, and others during the
1950s and 1960s.^ Out of this early work grew new fields such as genetic
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algorithms (GAs), evolutionary programming (EP), evolutionary strategies (ESs), and
genetic programming (GP).^ Although EP, ESs, and GP were both instrumental in the
development of the field ofEC, they are not detailed here as GAs are far more relevant to
this application.
3.3. Introduction to Genetic Algorithms (GAs)
The origins ofGAs can be found in the work of John H. Holland who worked in
the area ofEC during the 1960s.^ With a GA, problems are solved through a process that
mimics natural selection. Individuals in a population that are more “fit,” or have a higher
fitness, are more likely to pass on their “genes” to other generations. A GA is similar to
other algorithms rooted in EC in that it evolves a population of candidate solutions in
order to solve a problem or to find the optimum value of a function. However, GAs
differ from other forms of EC in that individuals in a population are referred to as
chromosomes. These chromosomes are made up of genes, and each gene has values
known as alleles.^ When chromosomes are represented as binary strings, each value in
the string is an allele. Alleles in chromosomes can also be represented as a numerical
value.^ In this method, the value of each allele must stay within the range ofvalid values
for the variable it represents. These two representations are known as binary-coded and












t = t + 1;
}
}
Figure 1: A pseudocode GA
3.3.1. Problem Solvingwith GA
The initial steps in a problem with a GA are similar to those found in
many EC-based algorithms: a population is randomly generated, and the fitness of each
member of the population is determined. After these two steps are completed, a new
population is generated. In order to create this new population, a process known as
reproduction or duplication occurs. In reproduction, an individual is picked, and a copy
of it is added to the new population.*® Several different methods can be used to
determine which individuals are chosen for the new population.
Three popular methods of selection are proportionate selection, ordinal-hased
selection, and tournament selection.** In proportionate selection, individuals are given a
probability that they will be selected based on their weight: the higher the weight, the
more likely they are to be selected. In ordinal-based selection, the assigned probability
that an individual will be chosen is based on the individual's rank.*^ In order to determine
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the rank, members of the population are ordered by their fitness; the higher an
individual's fitness is, the higher its ranking will be. A higher rank means that there will
be a higher probability that the individual will be selected. In tournament selection, a
randomly selected group of individuals imdergoes a “tournament” where the individual
with the highest fitness “wins” and is copied into the new population.*^ This tournament
process is repeated until the proper number of individuals has been copied.
After the parents are selected, the new population is altered, usually through
processes known as crossover and mutation.*^ Crossover is similar to the exchanging of
genes that occurs during the sexual reproduction of two organisms. In the crossover
process, the population is divided into pairs known as parents, and a random number
between 0 and 1, called the crossover rate, is generated. The crossover rate determines
the probability that two individuals will undergo crossover.*^ When two parent
individuals actually imdergo crossover, they usually “swap” parts of their chromosomes
in order to create two new individuals known as offspring. Otherwise, the parents are
copied directly into the new population. An example of this swapping process can be
seen in (a) in Figure 2. This method of crossover is known as two-point crossover since
two crossover points are used. The pipe characters that delineate the bolded sections of
(a) and (b) represent crossover points. These crossover points are randomly selected
before crossover occurs and tell the GA which parts of the parents' chromosomes are to
be swapped in order to create new offspring. Other forms of crossover include single-
point crossover, where only one crossover point is used, and uniform crossover, where
the parent whose gene is to be used for each allele of the offspring's chromosome is
14
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chosen randomly. Examples of these two types of crossover can be seen in (b) and (c)
in Figure 2. Other forms of crossover for real-coded GAs can be found in.*^
Parent Child
10|0100|11 -> 10110111
1111101101 -> 11010001(a)Two-Point Crossover
Parent Child
101010011 -> 10110101
111110101 -> 11010011(b)Single-Point Crossover
Parent Child
10010011 -> 11010001
11110101 -> 10110111(c)Uniform Crossover
Figure 2: Different types of crossover: two-point, single-point, and
uniform
After the reproduction phase, the new offspring may then imdergo mutation, a
process where alleles in each offspring's string are altered with a probability of p^.which
is called the mutation rate.^° In binary-coded GAs, the most basic form ofmutation can
be performed by flipping bits in the offspring's string from 0 to 1 or vice versa. For real-
coded GAs, mutation is performed by altering the value of an allele to a value within the
'71
range of possible values for that allele. Additional mutation procedures for real-coded
GAs can be foimd in the work ofHerrara, Lozano, and Verdegay.^^
After offspring are reproduced, undergo crossover, and are mutated, they may
replace their parents. GAs that use this method of replacement are called Generational
GAs.^^ The offspring may also replace the least fit or oldest member of the population.
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This type of GA is called a Steady-State GA?'* This process of selection, procreation,
and replacement is repeated until an appropriate solution for the problem to be solved.
3.4. Introduction to Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
Another technique related to the field of EC is PSO^® which applies sociological
theory regarding how people or animals communicate and learn fi’om one another to EC.
Unlike other EC algorithms, in PSO, individuals are called particles, and the population is
called a swarm. PSO uses the swarm of particles to solve, or find the optimum solution
for, a problem. Also, unlike EC algorithms like GAs, particles are never replaced in the
swarm. The name of this algorithm is derived fi-om the fact that the particles in PSO
behave similarly to “swarming” animals such as a flock ofbirds or a school of fish.^^
3.4.1. Overview ofParticles in PSO
A particle consists of 3 vectors: the x-vector, the p-vector, and the v-
vector.^^ Each vector contains a number of elements equal to the number of dimensions
in the problem space; this number of dimensions is equal to the number of variables in
the problem to be solved. The x, v, and p vectors each serve a different purpose in a
PSO. The x-vector stores the current position of the particle. Each element in this vector
corresponds with a single dimension of the search space and stores a coordinate for the
dimension that it represents. The p-vector, on the other hand, is used to store the
particle's best recorded position. An evaluation fimction is used to determine the fitness
of the particle's current position, and if the particle's current position has a higher fitness
than that of all of the particle's previous positions, the position stored in the current x-
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vector is stored in the p-vector. The third vector, the v-vector, is added to the x-vector in
order to determine the particle's next position.
3.4.2. Problem Solving with PSO
The initial steps necessary to solve a problem with PSO are identical to
those found in other EC algorithms. First, a swarm of particles must be generated. This
initial swarm population is randomly generated, meaning that values of each particle's x-
and v-vectors are initialized to random values.^* Next, the fitness of each particle's x-
vector is compared to that of its p-vector; if the x-vector's fitness is higher, the current x-
vector becomes the new p-vector value. A particle's p-vector is then compared to that of
its neighbors, i.e., the group of particles that are “close” to a particular particle.^^ The
size and members of a particle's neighborhood depend on the swarm's topology. Two
popular topologies are circle and star.^® In a circle topology, a particle's neighborhood
consists of its N closest neighbors, where N is less than the total number of particles in
the swarm. In a star topology, a particle's neighborhood is every other particle in the
swarm. When a particle with the best p-vector (the one with the highest fitness) in a
neighborhood is foimd, it is labeled the Ibest for a circle topology or the gbest for a star
topology.^ ‘ The neighborhood's best particle's p-vector is used to calculate the new v-
vector for each particle in the neighborhood. In order to make a particle move, a new
value for the v-vector is calculated and is added to the particle's current location. The
formulas used to calculate the value of the v-vector can be foimd below.
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Vid = Vid + ((pi mdO (pid - Xid)) + (cp2 mdO (pgd - Xid))
Xid = Xid + Vid
Formulas used to calculate the new v-vector value for a particle. The i
represents the index of the particle whose v-vector is being updated, and g
is the best performer in the neighborhood. The d represents the dimension
of the v-vector whose value is being calculated. The <|»i and <|)2 variables
are called the cognition component and the social component.
The (|)i and (|)2 variables present in the formulas, used to update a particle's v-
vector, are called the cognition component and the social component, respectively.^^ In
sociology, the social component represents the amount that a person's decisions are
influenced by the decisions of those around him or her. With respect to the PSO, the
social component determines how much the value of the particle's v-vector is affected by
the neighborhood’s best performer.^^ The cognition component represents the amoimt
that a person's decisions are influenced by his or her own understanding and experiences.
With respect to the PSO, the cognition component determines how much the value of the
particle's v-vector is affected by the particle's own “experience.” A particle’s experience
can be considered to be its best performance, determined by its p-vector value.^** A
particle swarm can allow a particle's previous best performance or the best performance
of other particles in the swarm to have more of an impact on the movement of the
particle. This is accomplished by altering the values of the social and cognition
components.^^ To have the performance of the global best particle has more ofan impact
on the particle's new location, the social component could be made greater than the
cognition component. This causes the v-vector value calculated in Equation 1 to be more
affected by the global best particle’s p-vector, which is multiplied by the social




cognition component could be made greater than the social component. This causes the
value calculated in Equation 1 to be more affected by the particle’s own p-vectorwhich is
multiplied by the cognition component, (pi.
The process of updating the particle's vectors to allow it to move about the
problem space is repeated until an optimum solution is found or until some other
condition is met.
3.4.3. Improving PSO Performance Through Velocity Control
The velocity of a particle can be controlled in order to increase or decrease
the precision of the swarm's search capability or to keep its velocity from becoming too
large.^^ The velocity can be (K)ntrolled in a variety ofways. One method is the use of a
Vmax. a maximum value for the magnitude of a particle's velocity.^’ This variable
creates a range from -Vmax to Vmax that the particle's velocity must remain within.
This is the most basic form of particle velocity control. Another method is the use of an
inertiaweieht represented as (o. The inertia weight is used to change how much the old
v-vector value affects the new v-vector value. This value is multiplied by a particle's old
v-vector value when the new v-vector value is calculated.^^ Equations 3 and 4 show the
inertia weight version of v-vector formula. A third method of velocity control is the
constriction coefficient represented as The use of this variable has also been shown
to improve swarm performance.^’ Equations 5 and 6 show an updated version of the v-
vector formula which uses the constriction coefficient, and Equations 7 and 8 show the
formula used to calculate the constriction coefficient.
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Vi = (co Vid ) + ((pi mdO (Pid - Xid)) + ((p2 rndQ (Pgd - Xid)) (3)
Xi = Xi + Vi (4)
The V-vector formula with an inertia weight of co
Vi = K (vid + (cpl mdO (Pid - Xid)) + ((p2 md() (pgd - Xid))) (5)
Xid = Xid + Vid (6)
The V-vector formulawith a constriction coefficient ofK
K = 2/12- (p - sqrt({p^ - 4(p) | (7)
9 = <pl+(p2, (p>4 (8)
The formula used to calculate K
3.5. Artificial Immune Systems (AISs)
Hojfineyr and Forrest propose a network IDS called Lightweight Intrusion
Detection System (LISYS) which helps to detect network-based attacks on broadcast
LANs. This IDS was based on an artificial immune system (AIS) named ARTIS. The
purpose of ARTIS was to develop a system that exhibits the properties of a biological
immune system (BIS) such as robustness, adaptivity, and autonomy that make it effective
in fighting infection in the body. This goal is accomplished through the use of
components that replicate the behavior of the special cells called lymphocytes that are
present in a BIS.^^ Lymphocytes are a type of white blood cell and respond to the
presence ofharmful elements in the body.'*^
3.5.1. An Overview of the BIS
One of the basic functions of a BIS is to detect the presence of foreign,
potentially harmful elements, known as pathogens, in the body.^^ In order to accomplish
this, the BIS divides elements that it observes into two sets: self, or cells that belong in
20
the body, and non-self, foreign cells that do not belong in the body and may be harmful/®
To detect non-self elements in the body, cells called lymphocytes are used.'*^ These cells
are covered with special proteins called receptors. Receptors allow the cell to bind itself
to parts of the pathogen called epitope. Whether or not a lymphocyte and a pathogen will
bind depends on the affinity of the receptor and the epitope; the affinity is determined by
the similarity of the shape and electrical charge ofboth the epitope and the receptor.^*
The immime system protects the body by generating a set of lymphocytes from
the stem cells present in bone marrow.^^ In the marrow, lymphocytes are given a
randomly generated set of receptors. These cells then undergo a training process in the
thymus, a gland located in the throat, where the lymphocytes are exposed to selfcells; ifa
lymphocyte binds itself to a self cell, it is destroyed.®® This process is called negative
selection. After the training process is completed, ideally, a set of lymphocytes that will
only bind with non-self elements in the body will be created. This set can then be used to
detect the presence of pathogens in the body. The BIS is also able to “memorize”
previously observed pathogens in order to increase its speed and efficiency.®* This is
accomplished through the use ofmemory cells. When a lymphocyte has been bound to a
pathogen, the lymphocyte becomes what is known as a memory cell. These memory
cells memorize previously encountered pathogens in order to increase the speed of the
BIS’s response to potentially harmful agents in the body and to allow the BIS to detect
pathogens with similar structures to previously encoimtered ones.®^
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3.5.2. AIS Design
AISs are designed so that they have components and behaviors that are
analogous to those in a BIS/^ The lymphocytes that are used to detect the presence of
non-self elements in a BIS are represented by detectors. The receptors that cover the
surface of lymphocytes and the epitope regions of a pathogen are both represented by
fixed-length binary strings.^^ In a computer system, a pathogen is considered to be an
attack, a virus, or any other potentially harmful network traffic or computer activity. In
order to replicate the negative selection process by which lymphocytes are trained to only
bind with non-self cells, an AIS first exposes newly created, or immature, randomly
generated detectors to a training set of self strings for a time period T.^^ This time period
is known as the tolerization period, and any detectors that match a self string during this
period are eliminated fium the set. This process creates a set ofmature detectors that will
only bind to non-self elements. These mature detectors are then released into the AIS's
distributed environment which is represented as a graph.^^ The graph consists of a set of
vertices and a set of edges that connect those vertices. Each vertex in a graph has its own
set of detectors, and each edge can be used by a detector in order to travel fi-om one point
to another. If one of these mature detectors happens to match the number of non-self
elements required by the activation threshold (t), the number of non-self elements a
mature detector must match in order to become activated, a signal that a potentially
harmful non-self element has been foimd is produced.^’ Since in the body, the
lymphocytes are able to bind with several similar kinds of pathogens, the AIS uses
approximate matching rather than exact matching so that detectors can be bound to more
than one type of non-self element.^* This functionality increases the system’s ability to
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find non-self elements. ARTIS also implements the memory-based detection of the
immvme system. A memory detector is created when more than one mature detector is
matched by a non-self string. The AIS compares the extent to which each of the
matching detectors matches the non-self string, and the closest matches are promoted to
memory detector status.^^ Copies of these memory detectors are distributed to nearby
nodes, improving each of the neighboring nodes’ ability to match and respond to that
particular non-self string and others like it.
CHAPTER 4
IMMUNITY-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
4.1. Introduction to Immunity-Based IDSs
Much research has been done in the area of immxmity-based IDSs.* As a result of
this research, several IDSs have been developed that apply the characteristics of a BIS to
the field of intrusion detection. Out of these many IDSs, the ones that are most relevant
to this thesis are those developed by Hofineyr and Forrest,^ Harmer et al., and
Dasgupta.^
4.2. Lightweight Intrusion Detection System (LISYS)
The focus of Hofineyr and Forrest^ is LISYS, an application of ARTIS aimed at
providing network intrusion detection capabilities. LISYS uses data structures called
datapath triples in order to represent both self and non-self traffic.^ These triples consist
of the source and destination IP addresses of two communicating computers and the TCP
port used by the two machines. In order for this datapath information to be used by
LISYS, it is converted into a 49-bit string used to uniquely identify each coimection
across the network. In LISYS, self traffic is considered to be any normally occurring




environment of ARTIS is the network to be monitored. The network is represented as a
fully connected graph which consists ofa set ofvertices, which represent computers, and
connective edges, which represent connections between the computers. Since LISYS is
being applied to a broadcast LAN, it can be assumed that every computer is connected to
every other computer on the network, hence the fully connected graph. At each vertex in
the graph, there exists a set of detectors that the computer can use in order to detect non¬
selfactivity.
The LISYS offers several improvements over the forms of network intrusion
detection that exist today.^ Many current NIDSs, such as Snort, use signature-based
detection in order to detect attacks.*® Signature-based systems search packets for strings
called attack signatures that are associated with a specific type of attack.** If an attack
signature is foimd in a packet, an alarm is generated. This approach to intrusion detection
suffers from problems that decrease its effectiveness.*^ For instance, the use of attack
signatures requires a human operator to ensure that the signature database is always up to
date and to manually add new signatures. Because of this property, NIDSs cannot
automatically adapt to new forms of attack or to attacks with signatures similar to those
of already existing ones.*^ Another problem is that signature based NIDSs are
susceptible to high FP rates.*'* This high false alarm rate is caused by the presence of
benign packets on the network which happen to contain a piece of data that matches an
attack signature. This weakness also causes signature-based NIDSs to be susceptible to
attacks that intentionally generate high numbers of FPs in order to conceal the alarms
produced by actual attacks.*^ Also, NIDSs often employ intrusion detection sensors at
several locations in the network.*^ These sensors collect data and send them to a central
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server so that they can be analyzed and attacks can be detected. The centralized server
introduces a single point of failure into the NIDSs, allowing the system to be easily
disabled if the server is attacked.*’ Since the intrusion detection sensors will most likely
be similar, it may be possible to disable the entire system with a single type of attack that
takes advantages of a vulnerability in the NIDS software.** A third issue with this
method is that if the number of sensors becomes large, performance will suffer due to the
large amount ofdata that the server must process. *^
The AIS that the LISYS is based on allows the system to avoid these
shortcomings of current NIDSs.^® The lack of required communication between the
components of LISYS allows the system to be less vulnerable to attack. If a node or
several nodes are disabled, the system should still be able to perform sufficiently.’* Also,
since components of the system do not communicate with a central server or with each
other, the system is more scalable. More nodes can be added without increasing the
amount ofdata that has to be analyzed in order to detect anomalous activity and to protect
the network. Also, the approximate signature matching capability of the LISYS allows
the system to detect the presence of attacks with similar signatures. This ability mimics
the BIS’s ability to detect the presence of pathogens that have chemical and molecular
structures that are similar to others. The LISYS is also able to “teach” itself about new
attacks and changes in the behavior of the system without needing a human operator to
constantly update a signature database.’^ This is accomplished through the occasional
death of mature detectors and their replacement with new, immature detectors.’^ The
constant introduction of new trained detectors allows the detector set to cope with
changing self and non-self sets. Another major benefit of the LISYS is its accuracy.
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Whereas current intrusion detection systems, such as those researched by Lippman et al.
in, suffer fiom high FP rates, the LISYS uses methods such as activation thresholds and
tolerization which decrease the number ofFPs generated.^^
43. Computer Defense Immune System (CDIS)
Harmer et al.^* proposes an agent-based IDS called the Computer Defense
Immime System (CDIS) based on a BIS which focuses primarily on the detection and
elimination of computer viruses. This system aims to overcome the shortcomings that
plague current AV systems. A major problem with current AV systems is that viruses are
being produced at a faster rate than researchers can learn how to eradicate them.^^ When
a new virus is discovered, virus experts analyze the virus’s code, behavior, and the
signature it contains in order to update virus scanners to handle the new threat. The time-
consuming nature of this process, along with the rapid increase in the rate at which
viruses are being developed and deployed, threatens to make the problem of eradicating
viruses impossible to handle.^® Harmer et al.^* aims to solve this problem by basing then-
application on a BIS so that it can exhibit properties such as adaptivity, autonomy, and
selective response.
43.1. CDIS System Hierarchy
The CDIS is divided into a three-layer hierarchy which consists of a
system layer, a network layer, and a local layer. The system is broken up in this maimer
in order to decrease the amoimt of resources needed to run the system by splitting up the
system’s tasks.^^ Each of these layers has different functions that, when combined.
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provide an effective method of identifying and eliminating viruses. The system level
determines what problems are occurring throughout the entire system, stores memory
detectors, and provides information on handling viruses that it receives from the network
layer to all of the computers in the system. The next layer, the network layer, works to
protect a local group of computers. It determines what viruses have infected the
computers in the group, reports to the system layer, and gives vaccinations for viruses to
computers in its group.^^ The lowest layer, the local layer, operates in each individual
computer. Each computer has a set of detectors which detects the presence of virus
infection and allows alarms to be produced. The size of this detector set is limited in
order to decrease the computational cost associated with generating the set.^'* Since
information about protection from a particular virus is always shared throughout the
system, this limited detector set does not decrease the effectiveness ofthe system.
4.3.2. Agents of GDIS
As mentioned earlier, the GDIS is an agent-based system. The
flmctionality of the GDIS is divided among seven types of agents: antibodies, detectors,
monitors, helpers, classifiers, cleaners, and controllers. These agents provide functions
similar to the different entities of a biological immune system. Their functions are
summarized below and are described more in depth in Harmer et al.’s work:^^
• Antibody - Generates detector strings that will only match non-self strings,
strings that may represent code associated with a virus
• Detector - Uses several antibodies in order to determine if a string is associated
with a virus
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• Monitor - Communicates with controller agents and produces alarms
• Helper - VaJidates and tells user about alarms
• Classifier - Determines what type of virus has infected the system and how it
should be fixed
• Cleaner - Eradicates viruses and repairs damage done
• Controller - Coordinate the activity of the entire system
Each of these agents can interact in a variety of ways with other agents in order to use
different services to complete tasks. For instance, the generation of an alarm requires
communication between a detector and monitor.^^ In order to allow the different agents
in the system to collaborate and interact to replicate the functionality of an immune
system, CDIS uses a combination ofMessage Oriented Middleware (MOM) and the Java
Shared Data Toolkit (JSDT). The MOM used in this system is called AgentMOM.
AgentMOM is a communications framework geared towards the development of
multiagent systems and supports broadcast, multicast, and secure communication
•sm
between agents. JSDT is software that allows for the development of Java applications
•IQ
that can interact with one another.
4.3.3. BeneHts ofCDIS
The system proposed by Harmer et al.^^ provides several improvements
over current AV systems. First, the organization of the system into a hierarchy allows
different tasks to be delegated to different layers of the application. This allows the cost
of executing the CDIS to be spread across all computers using the system. Another
benefit is the application’s ability to disseminate information related to the eradication of
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viruses to all computers in the system and to be able to detect unknown viruses through
constant introduction of new detectors/® This capability removes the need for virus
experts to rush to determine how to eliminate newly developed viruses and for computer
users to constantly update virus scanners with new signature databases. Because of these
benefits, this method of virus detection and elimination is a vast improvement over
current AV systems.
4.4. Negative Characterization (NC)
Dasgupta^* proposes an anomaly detection system based on an AIS that can detect
the level of abnormality of traffic on the network. His approach differs from those used
in other AISs'*^ in that it does not divide activity on networks and computer systems into
“self’ and “non-self.” Dasgupta chooses this approach because the behavior of a system
cannot simply be divided into “good” and “bad” categories.^^ While the behavior of a
computer system or network may stray from what is considered normal, this deviation
may be caused by benign occurrences such as the installation of new software or letting
another person borrow a computer.'*^ This harmless activity may trigger alarms in some
AlS-based security systems. In order to correct this shortcoming, Dasgupta proposes a
system that would divide traffic data into multiple categories based on the traffic’s level
of deviation from what is considered normal. In order to accomplish this, a method
called negative characterization (NC) is used which extends the negative selection
process foimd in the works of others.^® In NC, a variability parameter is used which
determines how much a sample is allowed to deviate from the self space, the group of
strings which represents normal behavior without being labeled as non-self.^ The
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parameter is used as an input to a GA along with sets of data that represent the normal
behavior of the system in order to produce a set of rules that can effectively detect
malicious activity. In order to detect varying levels of abnormality, the NC method uses
different values for the variability parameter
4.4.1. NC vs. Positive Characterization (PC)
Dasgupta'** compares the performance of NC to that of a method called
positive characterization (PC). PC stores the entire collection of strings that represents
normal behavior and tests incoming samples to determine whether they belong to the self
set or the non-self set. While this is an effective method ofdetecting the presence of non¬
self elements, it suffers from the fact that a large number of samples must be stored.'*^
Both of these methods were tested against the Lincoln Laboratory’s 1999 intrusion
detection data set.^° This data set contains five weeks of network traffic which includes
simulated network attacks. In Dasgupta’s paper,^’ only the first two weeks of data are
used, and only five attacks are considered: back, 2 portsweep attempts, satan, and
neptune. These attacks are explained in detail in the DARPA Intrusion Detection
Evaluation. During the test, Dasgupta discovered that while PC outperforms NC, it is
only by a small margin. Since NC requires far less resources than PC and produces
similar results, NC is a more preferable algorithm.
4.5. Overview ofGENERTIA
The Genetic Interactive Teams for Intrusion Detection Design and Analysis
(GENERTIA)^^ system is designed to improve the performance of AlS-based IDSs^"* by
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detecting vulnerabilities and repairing them. These vulnerabilities are referred to as holes
and represent attacks that the AIS detector set cannot detect.^^ The GENERTIA system
consists of two components based on GAs:^^ the GENERTIA red team (GRT), which is
used to detect holes, and the GENERTIA blue team (GBT), which is used to patch
them.^’ These two subsystems work together in order to correct holes in an AlS-based
IDS. The GRT detects holes in the IDS by first using its GA to generate a group of
packets, called “red” packets, which represent possible attacks against a host or network.
These packets are then exposed to the AIS's detector set to see if the set can detect the
malicious packet; if an attack packet goes completely undetected, it is registered as a
vulnerability. Afterwards, the GRT collects information related to the detected
vulnerabilities and passes it to the GBT which produces patches for these vulnerabilities.
This process should decrease the FN rate of an AlS-based IDS.
4.5.1. Testing GENERTIA
In order to test GENERTIA's ability to detect vulnerabilities, an
experiment was conducted. In this experiment, network traffic is represented by datapath
triples.^* A datapath triple consists of the four octets of the destination IP address, the
port being used by the remote host, and a direction flag which determines whether the
packet it represents is part of inbound or outbound traffic. The AIS uses constraint-based
detectors^^ that consist of six value ranges in order to detect malicious data triples.^ The
first four ranges represent the set of IP addresses that the detector can detect; each range
represents one octet of the IP address. The fifth value range represents the range ofports
that the detector can detect The sixth value range can have the value of 0 or 1; 0
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represents incoming traffic, and 1 represents outgoing traffic. In order to determine
whether or not a packet and a detector match, a matching threshold^* is used. The value
of the matching threshold determines how many fields in a malicious data triple must be
in the detector's corresponding value ranges in order to be considered a match. For
instance, if the matching threshold is 4, 4 of the datapath triple's fields must fall into the
ranges of the detector in order to be considered a match. In this experiment, the matching
threshold is set to 3.
(192.168.0,16, 68, 0)
Figure 3: An example ofa datapath triple. 192.168.0.16 is the destination
host, 68 is the port being used by the remote host, and 0 is the direction
flag.
In order to train and test the AIS, the 1998 MIT Lincoln Lab Intrusion Detection
data set^^ was used. Only traffic involving one host (172.16.112.50) was used and all of
the packets were converted into the datapath triple format. 112 packets that represented
normal network traffic were used to train the AIS's detector set, and 1604 packets that
represent the attacks were used to test the AIS. In order to test the AIS, the detectors
were exposed to a packet from the training set in order to generate a set of mature
detectors. Next, the AIS was tested with the testing set. Finally, the GRT was used to
generate 300 red packets in order to detect 300 vulnerabilities in the AIS within 5000
iterations of the system. This experiment was executed 10 times each with 100,200,400,
and 800 detectors. In this experiment, the AISs with detector set sizes of 100, 200, and
400 averaged 300 vulnerabilities while the AIS with the detector set size of 800 averted
33
292.6 vulnerabilities. It was also observed that all 4 CRTs were able to detect at least
one vulnerability within 1000 iterations of GENERTIA. While these performance rates
are impressive, it may be possible to improve on GENERTIA's ability to detect
vulnerabilities through the use ofother EC-based methods such as PSO.
CHAPTERS
PARTICLE SWARM-BASED GENETIC RED TEAMS (GRTs)
5.1. Overview ofParticle Swarm-Based GRTs
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, although GA-based GRTs are able to
find 300 holes in an AlS-based IDS, it may be possible to improve GENERTIA’s
performance through the use of red teams based on PSO. The goal of the PSO-based
GRT is the same as that of the GA-based GRT: to evolve a population that will detect
300 holes in an AlS-based IDS.* In order to accomplish this, the PSO-based GRT
generates particles that consist of an x-vector, which records the current red packet
represented by the particle, a p-vector, which records the “best” red packet that this
particle has represented, and a v-vector, which is used to generate a new red packet. Both
the X- and p-vectors have associated fitnesses which determine what percentage of the
AlS-based IDS a red packet was able to evade.
5.2. Comparison ofGRTs
The original GA-based GRT’s performance was compared to that of 12 different
variants of PSO-based GRTs. The twelve swarm-based GRTs are named SWO, SW0+,
SWl, SW2, SW3, SW4, CCSWO, CCSW0+, CCSWl, CCSW2, CCSW3, and CCSW4.
The PSO-based GRTs differ in terms of the use of a constriction coefficient (CC),
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neighborhood size, the use of particle termination (PT),^ and the use of a random best
particle (RB).^ PT determines whether or not a particle will stop searching for
vulnerabilities once one has been encountered, and RB determines whether or not the best
particle used to update each particle’s v-vector is randomly selected or not. Table 1
shows the features ofeach of the twelve swarms.
Alg CC Neighborhood PT RB
SWO no local no no
SW0+ no local yes no
SWl no global no no
SW2 no global no yes
SW3 no global yes no
SW4 no global yes yes
ccSWO yes local no no
CCSW0+ yes local yes no
ccSWl yes global no no
ccSW2 yes global no yes
ccSW3 yes global yes no
ccSW4 yes global yes yes
Table 1: The features of each of the 12 swarm-based GRTs
The GA and the 12 swarms were compared using the same experiment used to
test GENERTIA described in the previous chapter. The only difference is that rather than
test detector sets of 100, 200, 400, and 800, only detector sets of 400 were used. The
results of the experiment can be seen in Table 2.
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Alg Holes Ehiplicates Distinct
GA 300.0 4.9 295.1
SWO 271.7 8.4 263.3
SW0+ 298.4 21.0 277.4
SWl 297.8 51.7 246.1
SW2 292.5 50.2 242.3
SW3 299.1 62.7 236.4
SW4 300.0 62.4 237.6
ccSWO 129.7 1.0 128.7
CCSW0+ 275.0 3.0 272.0
ccSWl 272.8 27.8 245.0
ccSW2 284.6 50.5 234.1
ccSW3 296.1 25.4 270.7
ccSW4 297.1 16.7 280.4
Table 2; Resiilts of the comparison of the GA-based and the 12 PSO-based
GRTs. The holes column shows the average (over 10 trials) number of
holes found by each GRT, the duplicates colunm shows how many
duplicate holes each GRT found, and the distinct holes colunm shows how
many ofthe holes found by each GRT were unique.
After running each GRT 10 times, it was determined that the GA still had the best
overall performance, measured by the average number of distinct holes foimd over the 10
trials. Among the swarms, CCSW4 had the best performance overall, followed by
SW0H-. CCSW4 and CCSW0+ had the best performance out of the swarms that used CC,
and SWO and SW0+ had the best performance of those that did not use the coefficient.
With respect to the neighborhood size, when no CC was used, the swarms that had a local
neighborhood outperformed those that used a global one. When CC was used, the
swarms that used global neighborhood outperformed those that used a local
neighborhood. With respect to PT, when no CC was used, the PT swarms all
outperformed the non-PT swarms in terms of total holes found, but in terms of distinct
holes, only SW0+ outperformed the non-PT swarms. When CC was used, the PT swarms
ouq)erformed the non-PT swarms both in terms of total and distinct holes found. With
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respect to RB, both with and without CC, the performance of the RB swarms and non-RB
swarms differed by a few holes. These results of this experiment show that the use ofPT
can effectively improve the ability of a PSO based GRT, especially when used in
conjimction with CC.'* In Figures 4-6, 3D graphs of the holes found by the GA, SW0+,
and CCSW4 can be found. These three graphs display the different search behaviors of
the different GRTs. Upon reviewing the graphs, one can see that the GA tends to find
several small clusters of vulnerabilities, SW0+ tends to find vulnerabilities along the
boundaries of the search space, and CCSW4 tends to find vulnerabilities in a single large
cluster. These results suggest that these different search capabilities can be combined to
create a highly efficient “genetic swarm”-based GRT.
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Figure 6: A graph of the holes discovered by CCSW4
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, an overview of current intrusion detection methods, EC, and
immunity-based IDSs was given. In the overview of immunity-based IDSs, an
application known as GENERTIA was introduced. GENERTIA consists of a GA-based
red team which finds vulnerabilities in an AlS-based IDS and a GA-based blue team
which repairs the vulnerabilities found by the red team. The GA-based red team was
tested in order to determine how many holes it could find and how fast it could find them.
Afterwards, the GA red team’s behavior was compared to that of 12 different PSO-based
hackers. It was determined that although the GA found more unique holes than all 12 of
the swarm-based red teams, the CCSW4 and SW0+ swarms were able to provide a
performance closest to that of the GA. By studying the results of the comparison of the
GA and the 12 swarms, it was concluded that the use ofCC and PT can greatly improve a
PSO-based red team’s ability to find vulnerabilities in an AlS-based IDS.
6.1. FutureWork
There are several different possible research projects that could be based on this
thesis. During this experiment, the search behaviors of the GA, swarms that use CC, and
swarms that do not use CC were compared. It was hypothesized that the different search
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behaviors of the different types of red teams may be able to be combined in order to
create a more effective “genetic swarm.” A possible future research project could be to
implement the genetic swarm-based red team. In addition to the development of a
genetic swarm-based red team, the blue team mentioned earlier could be implemented in
order to patch any holes found by the red team and tested in order to measure its
performance. Also, a version ofGENERTIA could be developed which coxdd be applied
to a wireless LAN.
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